




Faith, Race, and Immigration: Assessing the Effect of Religiosity on Racial Beliefs and Attitudes

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ABSTRACT

How much, if at all, does religiosity influence racist and xenophobic beliefs? Evangelical support for bigoted and xenophobic policies is not a new phenomenon. Yet, despite the abundant scholarship on religiosity and race, we know little about the mechanisms through which scholars posit we are observing these negative outcomes. Namely, does religiosity affect support for bigoted and xenophobic attitudes? Alternatively, are demographics and belief systems more important predictors of bigoted and xenophobic attitudes? This paper is not an assessment of *if* religion affects politics or *if* politics affects religion. My contributions to the literature on race and politics include finding that religiosity has significant direct and indirect effects on attitudes toward racial minorities. I find that 10% of the negative effect on attitudes toward African Americans and 30% of the negative effect on attitudes toward Hispanics, immigrants, and the undocumented is an indirect effect of religiosity mediated through demographics and belief systems.

KEYWORDS

Religiosity; opinions; attitudes; racial resentment; immigration; undocumented

White Evangelical support for bigoted policies is not a new phenomenon. There is ample research linking religiosity and racial prejudice.¹ The initial scholastic endeavors focused on religious affiliation, involvement, and racial attitudes.² Catholics and Protestants who attended church regularly were found to be more racially prejudiced than those who did not attend regularly.³ Individuals that were interested in religion for social gain (the extrinsically religious) were more racially prejudiced than those who were intrinsically religious.⁴ The link between the extrinsically religious and racism has weakened over time, but research has shown that this is primarily due to a desire to not appear racist.⁵ This is important because the political party of the Religious

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¹Deborah L. Hall, David C. Matz, and Wendy Wood, "Why Don't We Practice What We Preach? A Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 1 (2010), 126–39.

²C. Daniel Batson and Christopher T. Burris, *Personal Religion: Depressant Or Stimulant of Prejudice and Discrimination* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994).

³Gordan Allport and B. M. Kramer, "Social Sources of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology* 22 (1946), 9–39.

⁴Gordon Allport and Michael Ross, "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 5, no. 4 (1967), 432–43.

⁵Constantine Sedikides and Jochen E. Gebauer, "Religiosity as Self-Enhancement: A Meta-Analysis of the Relation between Socially Desirable Responding and Religiosity," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 1 (2010), 17–36.

Right, Christian Conservatives, and family values is backing politicians and candidates who publicly belittle adversaries, defend the use of racial epithets, and outright lie and propagates conspiracy theories all without finding any serious conflicts between their religious beliefs and political affiliations. We know what is happening, but we do not understand the magnitude of religiosity's impact on support for racism and xenophobia? This paper is not an assessment of *if* religion affects politics or *if* politics affects religion. The research found that Christianity has always played an important role in shaping American politics.⁶ Nonetheless, other scholars have found that it is politics which influences religion.⁷

I am concerned primarily with how much, if at all, does religiosity influence racist and xenophobic opinions and attitudes. Despite the abundant scholarship detailing the connections among religiosity and racism and xenophobia, we know little about the path through which scholars posit we are observing these negative outcomes. Specifically, does religiosity affect support for racism and xenophobia? Or are demographics and political beliefs more important predictors of racism and xenophobia?

In this study, I utilize the American National Election Studies 2012 (ANES) and employ two different statistical analysis methods to estimate the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on racism and xenophobia mediated through observed measures of demographics, political beliefs, and ideology. The ANES is a time series survey that includes a rich array of objective measures of beliefs, attitudes, and religiosity. I use the 2012 ANES for two reasons: (1) these juxtaposed attitudes and beliefs existed before the 2016 presidential election cycle and (2) the quality and strength of the questions measuring religiosity and racism and xenophobia included in the ANES 2012 are superior to the questions included in the ANES 2016. I use several comprehensive measures of religiosity, capturing religious affiliation, beliefs, and behavior, allowing for a robust examination of its effect on racism and xenophobia. Previous studies have included various measures of religiosity, but they have not utilized structural equation modeling to assess the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on racism and xenophobia.⁸

My initial contribution is a clearer understanding of the direct and indirect relationship between religion, race, and politics. I find that religiosity has heterogenous effects across race and religious affiliation and that religiosity has a large and significant negative effect on beliefs about and attitudes toward racial minorities, particularly the undocumented (Hispanics). When estimating the indirect effects of religiosity on negative beliefs about and attitudes toward African Americans I find that 13% of the total effect is an indirect effect of religiosity on demographics and ideological belief systems. Moreover, when estimating the indirect effects of religiosity on negative beliefs about and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants I find that 31% of the total effect is an indirect effect of religiosity on demographics and ideological belief

⁶Ibram Kendi, *Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America* (New York, NY: Random House, 2017).

⁷Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neihsel, and Kimberly H. Conger, "Are the Politics of the Christian Right Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy," *Political Research Quarterly* 71, no. 4 (2018), 910–22.

⁸Engin Karadag, "Spiritual Leadership and Organizational Culture: A Study of Structural Equation Modeling," *Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice* 9, no. 3 (2009), 1391–1405; Laura J. Lutjen, Nava R. Siltan, and Kevin J. Flannelly, "Religion, Forgiveness, Hostility and Health: A Structural Equation Analysis," *Journal of Religion and Health* 51, no. 2 (2012), 468–78.

systems. Lastly, my results suggest that individuals higher in religiosity had been primed with more negative beliefs and attitudes about undocumented immigrants than their peers. My findings strongly suggest that religiosity can and is playing a significant and political role in shaping American mass politics. My results strongly suggest that the causal arrow points in my hypothesized direction—religiosity increases moral traditionalism and conservatism, which subsequently increases negative beliefs about and attitudes toward racial minorities. This research moves the conversation from what is happening to *how* it is happening.

I begin with a discussion of religion, religiosity, and American politics. Next, I discuss racial resentment and public opinion toward Hispanics and immigrants. The analysis then proceeds in two parts. I begin with direct effects models establishing a relationship between religiosity, racism, and xenophobia. I then estimate two structural equation models to examine the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on racism and xenophobia, mediated through political values and ideology. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for American politics.

Religion, Religiosity, and American Politics

Johnson, Rowatt, and LaBouff were the first to estimate a causal relationship between religiosity and prejudice against African Americans.⁹ They found that regardless of how religious a participant was, both overt and subtle racism increased after being primed subliminally with religious concepts. This is important because America is inundated with religious images, and simply being near a church was found to produce increased negative attitudes toward Blacks.¹⁰ Most recently, Howard and Sommers found that priming individuals with images of White Jesus, and not White males in general, increased White people's negative attitudes toward African Americans. Essentially, White people become more racist when they see images of White Jesus. These findings suggest that individuals do hold deeply religious beliefs and deeply discriminatory attitudes.

In 2018, a Quinnipiac Poll found that 66% of Americans opposed separating immigrant children from their parents. However, 75% of White Evangelicals rated the policy as positive compared with only 25% of Non-White Christians.¹¹ The White Evangelicals were found to be weighing their potential moral discomfort with family separation and detention of immigrant children against their primary social concerns, such as overturning gay marriage and abortion.¹² White Evangelicals overwhelmingly identify as Republican, and Republicans were the only political party or other social group to support family separations (55%).¹³

⁹Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt, and Jordan LaBouff, "Priming Christian Religious Concepts Increases Racial Prejudice," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 1, no. 2 (2010), 119–26.

¹⁰David Morgan, *Visual Piety: A History and Theory of Popular Religious Images* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).

¹¹M. Boorstein and J. Zauzme, "Why Many White Evangelical Christians are Not Protesting Family Separations on the US Border," *Washington Post*, June 18, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/06/18/why-many-white-evangelical-christians-are-not-protesting-family-separations-on-the-u-s-border/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d352a418dfb9.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Quinnipiac University/Poll, "Stop Taking the Kids, 66 Percent of U.S. Voters Say, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Support for Dreamers is 79 Percent."

Hawley argues that the political power of the Religious Right is waning because of an overall decline in religious affiliation.¹⁴ Religious affiliation or belonging is a strong predictor of political participation, party identification, and political attitudes, and it has a greater effect than religious behavior.¹⁵ Religious behavior is the actual practice of religious faith, such as attending church. It is strongly associated with political attitudes.¹⁶ These are important because religious leaders (pastors, etc . . .) and the social context (church service, Mass, etc . . .) in which political information is filtered down to membership influences opinions and attitudes.¹⁷ The Religious Right has been found to influence the Republican Party through electoral mobilization and policy expertise. They can advise candidates as to which moral issues will help them win elections.¹⁸ Morality politics are at the center of many social conflicts (i.e., abortion and same-sex marriage). They serve as a central link between beliefs and attitudes.¹⁹

One of the most important issues affecting the political power of the religious community is the schism between those who attend church regularly and those who attend infrequently or never attend (the worship-attendance gap). For Whites, the worship-attendance gap is larger than it has ever been. However, the declines are largely occurring in Mainline Protestant denominations. Evangelical denominations have not experienced decreases in attendance.²⁰ Since the 1970's, the number of White Republicans who attend church regularly has been increasing, while the number of White Democrats who attend church regularly has been decreasing.²¹ The 2008 National Annenberg Election Study found that over 40% of Non-Evangelical Protestants and over 50% of Evangelical Protestants and Non-Denominational Non-Evangelicals attend church weekly and identify as Republican. Additionally, roughly 70% of Mormons who attend church regularly identify as Republican.²² Regardless, the Whites who are not attending church are not becoming more liberal.²³ There has been little change in reported religious beliefs because attendance is not an indication of affiliation. Many individuals do not attend church regularly for various reasons, yet still consider themselves religiously affiliated. Again, religious affiliation has a greater effect than behavior. It includes an acceptance of religious doctrine and ideology.

Evangelicals possess a religiocultural or ideological tool kit: a deep belief in individualism, relationalism, and anti-structuralism.²⁴ Individualism is the basic assumption that individuals exist independent of institutions, have free will, and are accountable for their actions. Relationalism refers to a strong emphasis on interpersonal

¹⁴George Hawley, *Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016).

¹⁵Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, Gizem Arıkan, and Marie Courtemanche, "Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration Sentiment," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (2015), 203–21.

¹⁶Geoffrey Layman, *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001).

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Brett M. Clifton, "Romancing the GOP: Assessing the Strategies used by the Christian Coalition to Influence the Republican Party," *Party Politics* 10, no. 5 (2004), 475–98.

¹⁹See note 16 above.

²⁰See note 14 above.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²George Hawley, *White Voters in 21st Century America* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).

²³See note 16 above.

²⁴Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).

relationships and the idea that salvation can only come from a personal relationship with Christ. Anti-structuralism is an inability or unwillingness to accept structural or institutional explanations for inequalities.²⁵ This latter is associated with a deep mistrust in and condemnation of institutions and out-groups.²⁶ This is important because White Evangelicals are socially isolated.²⁷ Research has found that 90% of congregations are comprised almost entirely (at least 90%) of a single racial group.²⁸

This racial isolation is associated with Evangelicals being more likely to accept the status quo, to individualize racial disparities, and to blame Blacks for their social status.²⁹ Edgell and Tranby found that a one-unit increase in religious involvement among Whites was associated with an 8% decrease in believing prejudice and discrimination are important explanations for African American inequality, a decrease in support for government intervention as a solution for racial inequality, and an increase in believing Blacks are lazy. Comparing men and women, they find that highly Orthodox White women are far more likely than Non-Orthodox White women to not believe in systemic or institutional racism. Religiosity has no effect on White men's views of systemic racism. Irrespective of their level of religiosity, White men are equally as likely not to believe in institutional racism.³⁰

Religiosity is independent of church attendance and not mutually exclusive with racist beliefs.³¹ This juxtaposition is equally a part of Evangelical ideology and the founding American ideals. Evangelical ideology is intertwined with ideas of both religion as a social identity and nationalism, and as such, Christian Nationalist have been found to get their strongest support from Evangelicals.³² Christian Nationalism is associated with increased opposition toward out-groups and White Evangelicals are 40% more likely to believe African Americans only somewhat or do not at all share their vision of America.³³

Racial Resentment, Hispanics, and Immigrants

Racial resentment (RR) is a form of prejudice that combines stereotypes about the work ethic of and negative feelings toward African Americans.³⁴ As measured by the 5-factor model of personality measures, RR is negatively associated with openness and

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Eric Tranby and Douglas Hartmann, "Critical Whiteness Theories and the Evangelical "Race Problem": Extending Emerson and Smith's Divided by Faith," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 47, no. 3 (2008), 341–59.

²⁷See note 24 above.

²⁸Michael O. Emerson and Karen Chai Kim, "Multiracial Congregations: An Analysis of their Development and a Typology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42, no. 2 (2003), 217–27.

²⁹David R. Roediger, *Colored White: Transcending the Racial Past*, Vol. 10 (University of California Press, 2002); Penny Edgell and Eric Tranby, "Religious Influences on Understandings of Racial Inequality in the United States," *Social Problems* 54, no. 2 (2007), 263–88.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹S. Margolis, "American Affects: Abjection, Enthusiasm, Terror," *American Literary History* 30, no. 2 (2018), 343–54.

³²Eric L. McDaniel, Irfan Nooruddin, and Allyson Shortle F, "Divine Boundaries: How Religion Shapes Citizens' Attitudes Toward Immigrants," *American Politics Research* 39, no. 1 (2011), 205–233.

³³See note 15 above; See note 26 above.

³⁴Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

conscientiousness. The most racially resentful individuals have been found to demean the character of African Americans.³⁵ RR incorporates both traditional prejudice and race-neutral conservatism.³⁶ Critics have questioned its validity as a measure of racism, suggesting that racial resentment conflates racism with individualism and conservatism as well as predispositions about government.³⁷ RR has also been linked to expectations and beliefs in a just world and subsequent appraisals of minority group's deservingness.³⁸ However, RR is associated with less support for felon enfranchisement among both conservatives and liberals and higher support for voter ID laws among Republicans, Conservatives, and regular watchers of Fox News.³⁹ Leone and Presaghi found that Tea Party support was positively associated with racial resentment and negative evaluations of President Barack Obama.⁴⁰ Obama's presidency activated both old-fashioned racism and racial resentment.⁴¹ Scholars argue that the election of Obama unleashed a White backlash in the form of the Tea Party, which crescendoed into Trumpism.⁴²

Irrespective of how racism is measured, it appears to have played a major role in the election of Donald Trump. Negative attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants swayed both Democrats and Independents to vote for Trump.⁴³ Newman, Shah, and Collingwood found that Trump drew support from areas experiencing growth in their Latino population.⁴⁴ Ha found that Whites who live in areas with large Latino populations harbor more prejudice toward Hispanics.⁴⁵ The number of Hispanics within a state is positively associated with that state's likelihood of adopting anti-immigrant policies.⁴⁶ An increase in the size of a state's immigrant population is associated with the adoption of increasingly harsher immigration policies.⁴⁷ Residents of states with

³⁵Cindy D. Kam and Camille D. Burge, "Uncovering Reactions to the Racial Resentment Scale Across the Racial Divide," *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (2018), 314–320.

³⁶Christopher M. Federico and Rafael Aguilera, "The Distinct Pattern of Relationships between the Big Five and Racial Resentment among White Americans," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* (2018), 1–11.

³⁷David C. Wilson and Darren W. Davis, "Reexamining Racial Resentment: Conceptualization and Content," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 634, no. 1 (2011), 117–133.

³⁸Darren W. Davis and David C. Wilson, *Racial Resentment in the Political Mind* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2021).

³⁹David C. Wilson, Michael Leo Owens, and Darren W. Davis, "How Racial Attitudes and Ideology Affect Political Rights for Felons," *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 12, no. 1 (2015), 73–93.; David C. Wilson and Paul R. Brewer, "The Foundations of Public Opinion on Voter ID Laws: Political Predispositions, Racial Resentment, and Information Effects," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77, no. 4 (2013), 962–984.

⁴⁰Luigi Leone and Fabio Presaghi, "Tea Party Support, Racial Resentment and Evaluations of Obama: A Moderation Analysis," *Race and Social Problems* 10, no. 2 (2018), 91–100.

⁴¹Michael Tesler, "The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era," *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 1 (2012), 110–23.

⁴²Tatishe M. Nteta and Brian Schaffner, "New Poll shows Trump Supporters are More Likely to Fear a Majority-Minority US," *Washington Post*, 2016; Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, "Change they Can't Believe In," *The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*, 2013.

⁴³Marc Hooghe and Ruth Dassonneville, "Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 51, no. 3 (2018), 1–7.

⁴⁴Benjamin J. Newman, Sono Shah, and Loren Collingwood, "Race, Place, and Building a Base: Latino Population Growth and the Nascent Trump Campaign for President," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82, no. 1 (2018), 122–34.

⁴⁵Shang E. Ha, "The Consequences of Multiracial Contexts on Public Attitudes Toward Immigration," *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2010), 29–42.

⁴⁶Heather M. Creek and Stephen Yoder, "With a Little Help from our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism," *Policy Studies Journal* 40, no. 4 (2012), 674–97.

⁴⁷Graeme Boushey and Adam Luedtke, "Immigrants Across the US Federal Laboratory: Explaining State-Level Innovation in Immigration Policy," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (2011), 390–414.

more recent immigrants are more likely to view immigration as a threat and impose more restrictive immigration policies.⁴⁸ The presence of a threatening minority group increases the probability of competition over resources and increases political mobilization by the in-group. The threat must only be anticipated, rather than experienced, to produce this effect.⁴⁹ Research has also found that religiosity is important under distressing circumstances and becomes very important when individuals feel threatened.⁵⁰ McDaniel et al. found that Mainline Protestants, Evangelicals, and Catholics all view immigrants negatively; however, the group that holds the most negative opinions of immigrants are White Evangelicals.⁵¹

The research on religion and politics remains convoluted. Bloom et al. argues that the literature on religion and politics is ambivalent, finding both positive and negative effects.⁵² Ethnoreligious theories view religious traditions as key factors in the theoretical link between religion and attitudes. In effect, the beliefs exposed to churches affect the individual political ideology of its members.⁵³ Religious restructuring theories postulate that individual religious commitment or religiosity is a more effective predictor of the influence of religion on public opinion.⁵⁴ Essentially, those who attend church are more likely to hold deeper beliefs. The religious compassion hypothesis suggests that religion activates positive feelings toward co-religionists.⁵⁵ Lastly, the religious marginalization theory argues that religious minorities are more empathetic toward other minority groups and subsequently are more supportive of minority policies.⁵⁶ The research suggests that it is possible for individual Americans to simultaneously hold deeply religious beliefs along with deeply racist and xenophobic beliefs. I posit that religiosity is associated with increased moral traditionalism and conservatism, which subsequently is associated with an increase in negative beliefs about and attitudes toward racial minorities. I hypothesize (1) that religious beliefs will be associated with both positive and negative attitudes toward out-groups; (2) that the negative effects will be racially heterogeneous; and (3) that religiosity will have both a direct and an indirect effect on racism and xenophobia mediated through belief systems and ideology.

Data and Methods

Despite abundant scholarship detailing the inconsistencies within ideology and the subsequent increase in the prominence and rise of the Religious Right, we know little

⁴⁸Lauren M. McLaren, "Immigration and the New Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in the European Union: The Effect of Elites and the EU on Individual-Level Opinions regarding European and Non-European Immigrants," *European Journal of Political Research* 39, no. 1 (2001), 81–108.

⁴⁹James G. Gimpel and J. Celeste Lay, "Political Socialization and Reactions to Immigration-Related Diversity in Rural America," *Rural Sociology* 73, no. 2 (2008), 180–204.

⁵⁰Renate Ysseldyk, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman, "Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 1 (2010), 60–71.

⁵¹See note 32 above.

⁵²See note 15 above.

⁵³John Clifford Green, *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007); Benjamin R. Knoll, "'And Who Is My Neighbor?' Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48, no. 2 (2009), 313–31.

⁵⁴Green, *The Faith Factor*.

⁵⁵See note 15 above.

⁵⁶Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

about the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on socioeconomic variables, ideological positions, beliefs, and attitudes. We know there is a connection between religiosity and racism and xenophobia, yet we do not know how much religiosity is contributing to the later. I utilize the American National Election Studies 2012 which includes a large, diverse sample, detailed measures of demographic variables, religiosity, ideology, and measures related to subsequent political positions, beliefs, and attitudes. As aforementioned, I use the ANES 2012 because (1) these juxtaposed attitudes and opinions existed before Trumpism and the 2016 presidential election cycle and (2) the quality and strength of the questions measuring religiosity and attitudes toward out-groups included in the ANES 2012 are better than the questions included in the ANES 2016.

This comprehensive survey allows for a unique examination of how religiosity impacts racism and xenophobia. The ANES is a time series study conducted during presidential election years. Respondents are interviewed during the two months preceding the November election and then re-interviewed during the two months following the election. The response rate for the ANES 2012 was 38%. Pre-election 5,924 individuals were interviewed (2,054 face-to-face and 3,860 online) and post-election 5,510 individuals were interviewed (1,929 face-to-face and 3,581 online).

Independent Variables

Age is measured by the numerological age of the respondent. *Men* control for if the respondent is a man (1) or a woman (0). *Race* controls for if a respondent is White (0), Black (1), Hispanic (2), or mixed race (3). *Urbanism* controls if a respondent resides in a central city (1), a suburban area (2), or a rural or small town (3). The variable *south* controls for if a respondent resides in one of the eleven former states of the confederacy. *Income* is measured by a percentile. There are five categories: 0–16 (1); 17–33 (2); 34–67 (3); 68–95 (4); and 96–100 (5). *Work* controls if the respondent was employed (1); unemployed/laid off (2); retired (3); homemaker (4); and student (5). *Social class* controls for the respondents self-reported assessment of their social class. The possible responses were average working (1), working average/upper (2), upper working (3), average middle (4), middle class average/upper (5), and upper middle (6). *Union* controls if someone in the respondent's home was in a union (1) or not (0). *Education* is measured from eight or less (1) to having an advanced degree (7). The variable *parents* control for if the respondents' parents were both born in the United States. *Homeowner* controls if a respondent owns a home (1) or not (0). The variable *married* controls for a respondent's marital status. The possible responses were married (0); partner (1); never married (2); divorced (3); separated (4); widowed (5). *Children* control for if the respondent has children. The responses range from none (0) to eight or more (8).

The *racial composition* of a respondent's social environment is an additive index variable. Additive indices are a combination of identically coded ordinal variables all measured at the same level. Using questions measuring the racial composition of a respondent's neighborhood, grade school, junior high school, high school, workplace/businesses/shops, and friends. The possible responses were all White (1); mostly White

(2); half and half (3); mostly Black (4); and all Black (5). The original additive index ranged from 7 to 35. I subtracted the sum of the maximum value plus 1 (or 36) from the additive index which had the effect of making the index begin at 1 and end at 29 and reversing the index. As a result, the *racial composition* additive index ranged from all Black (1) to all White (29).

Dependent Variables

Equalitarianism was created using six questions measured from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5). The questions were asked from 1984 to 2012. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; we have gone too far in pushing for equal rights in this country; one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone a chance; it is not really that big a problem if some have more of a chance in life than others; this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are; and, if people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. I reordered the questions such that lower-numbered responses are associated with higher equalitarianism and higher-numbered responses are associated with lower equalitarianism. Next, I used the reordered question to create an additive index. The original additive index ranged from 6 to 30. I subtracted the sum of the maximum value plus 1 (or 31) from the additive index which had the effect of making the index begin at 1 and end at 25 and reversing the index. As a result, the equalitarianism additive index ranged from low (1) to high (25) equalitarianism.

The possible responses to the questions measuring *moral traditionalism* range from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5). The questions were asked from 1986 to 2012. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; the world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; this country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties; and, we should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own. I reordered the questions such that lower-numbered responses are associated with higher moral traditionalism and higher-numbered responses are associated with lower moral traditionalism. Next, I used the reordered question to create an additive index. The original additive index ranged from 4 to 20. I subtracted the sum of the maximum value plus 1 (or 21) from the additive index which had the effect of making the index begin at 1 and end at 17 and reversing the index. As a result, the moral traditionalism additive index ranged from low (1) to high (17) moral traditionalism.

Racial resentment questions were measured from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5). The questions asked if respondents agreed or disagreed with the following statements: conditions make it difficult for Blacks (1986–2012); Blacks should have special favors (1986–2004); Blacks must try harder to succeed (1986–2012); and, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (1986–2012). I reordered the questions such that lower-numbered responses are associated with higher racial resentment and higher-

numbered responses are associated with lower racial resentment. Next, I used the reordered question to create an additive index. The original additive index ranged from 4 to 20. I subtracted the sum of the maximum value plus 1 (or 21) from the additive index which had the effect of making the index begin at 1 and end at 17 and reversing the index. As a result, the racial resentment additive index ranged from low (1) to high (17) racial resentment.

The *number of immigrants* questions (1992 to 2012) asked if respondents believed the number of new incoming immigrants should be increased a lot (1), increased a little (2), left the same as now (3), decreased a little (4), or decreased a lot (5). The *Black* (1964–2012), *Black militants* (1970–1986), *Hispanic* (1976–2012), and *undocumented* (1988–2012) *thermometers* measure how favorable a respondent feels toward these groups. The responses ranged from 0 to 97. Ratings between 51 and 97° mean that a respondent felt favorably or warm toward the group and ratings between 0 and 49° mean that they did not feel favorably toward the group. If a respondent did not feel particularly warm or cold toward a group, the respondent would rate them at fifty degrees. Ideology is measured from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). The question was asked from 1972 to 2012.

Religiosity Variables

Church Attendance asked if a respondent attends church every week (1), almost every week (2), once or twice a month (3), a few times a year (4), or never (5). This question was asked from 1970 to 2012. Two variables measure the authority of the Bible in a respondent's life. The first, *Authority 1*, measures a respondent's view of Biblical authority from 1964 to 1990. The possible responses were the word of God/all true (1); contains human errors (2); written by men/God had nothing to do with it (3); and worth very little today (4). The second, *Authority 2*, measures the same concept from 1984 to 2012. The possible responses were the actual word of God (1); not everything in it should be taken literally (2); and not the word of God (3). *Important* asks if religion is important in a respondent's daily life (1) or not (0). *Guidance* asks if religion provides direction in a respondent's day-to-day life. The possible responses were religion is not important (0); some (1); quite a bit (2); and a great deal (3). *Religious affiliation* was measured as mainline Protestant (1); Evangelical (2), Roman Catholic (3); Jewish (4); non-traditional Orthodox (5); non-Christian/non-Jewish (6); and Atheist/agnostic/none/(7).

Results

Table 1 depicts the results of four OLS regressions. In Model 1 the dependent variable is the racial resentment index, in Model 2 the dependent variable is the Black feeling thermometer, in Model 3 the dependent variable is the Hispanic feeling thermometer, and in Model 4 the dependent variable is the undocumented feeling thermometer. As expected, the control variables show some significant and substantive effects. The coefficients for the independent variables are in their expected directions and are consistent with existing literature. A discussion of the results for the control variable can

Table 1. Religiosity and beliefs about and attitudes toward racial minorities.

Model Variables	(1) Racial resentment	(2) Black therm.	(3) Hispanics therm.	(4) Undocumented therm.
Age	-0.00202 (0.00703)	0.0152 (0.0214)	0.0813* (0.0257)	0.0638 (0.0522)
Men	0.399* (0.221)	-3.564** (0.670)	-3.023** (0.798)	-4.504** (1.637)
Black	-3.649** (0.404)	19.27** (1.249)	7.515** (1.535)	13.38** (3.008)
Hispanic	-2.228** (0.470)	4.215** (1.525)	16.04** (1.826)	23.89** (3.480)
Mixed race	-2.023** (0.696)	1.396 (2.433)	2.812 (2.880)	12.76* (5.193)
Education	-0.670** (0.0750)	1.293** (0.237)	0.408 (0.286)	0.763 (0.558)
Urbanism	0.0706 (0.161)	-0.0798 (0.469)	-0.822 (0.559)	-2.378* (1.202)
South	0.842** (0.268)	-0.480 (0.797)	0.492 (0.959)	-1.908 (1.993)
Income percentile	0.0918 (0.119)	-0.677* (0.351)	0.0753 (0.422)	0.820 (0.879)
Social class	0.232** (0.0695)	0.156 (0.214)	-0.0469 (0.253)	-0.233 (0.516)
Union HH	0.774** (0.274)	-0.769 (0.801)	-0.0394 (0.950)	-1.364 (2.034)
Ideology scale	0.474** (0.0820)	-1.066** (0.257)	-0.551* (0.302)	-2.043** (0.608)
Evangelical	0.387 (0.292)	2.608** (0.894)	1.927* (1.065)	-1.170 (2.172)
Catholic	0.886** (0.289)	3.023** (0.870)	3.062** (1.036)	1.602 (2.152)
Jewish	0.207 (0.813)	4.663* (2.192)	4.013 (2.544)	13.63* (6.064)
Non-Trad. Orthodox	0.578 (0.844)	-0.306 (2.346)	2.101 (2.843)	-6.938 (6.299)
Non-Christ/Jewish	-2.716 (1.915)	4.633 (3.501)	-0.255 (4.472)	4.555 (14.29)
Atheist		11.08 (7.682)	17.31* (8.244)	
Church attendance	0.387** (0.0907)	-0.717** (0.278)	-0.575* (0.327)	-0.602 (0.671)
Important	-0.0539 (0.422)	-0.228 (1.284)	-0.747 (1.532)	3.478 (3.141)
Guidance	-0.00745 (0.163)	1.253* (0.494)	1.726* (0.588)	1.224 (1.206)
Authority	-0.638** (0.190)	1.096 (0.593)	1.886** (0.709)	3.829** (1.416)
Constant	9.791** (0.961)	61.07** (2.919)	54.69** (3.462)	33.96** (7.122)
Observations	965	3,352	2,722	975
R-squared	0.260	0.131	0.074	0.138

Standard errors in parentheses.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

be found in [Appendix A](#). Below I expand on the results for the primary variables of interest.

Race

White men are significantly more racially resentful than their peers. White maleness is also associated with negative feelings toward Blacks, Hispanics, and the

undocumented. Conversely, Blacks and Hispanics are significantly less racially resentful and hold more favorable views of Blacks, Hispanics, and the undocumented. The coefficients for mixed raced respondents reached significance in the resentment and undocumented models. Mixed-raced individuals are less racially resentful and view undocumented immigrants more favorably.

Religious Affiliation

I found that Evangelicals are associated with positive feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. The Evangelical coefficient for racial resentment is positive and the coefficient for undocumented is negative but does not reach significance. This suggests some heterogenous beliefs. Catholics are positively associated with racial resentment and warmer feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. This too suggests that Catholics hold heterogenous beliefs. Jewish respondents are associated with warmer feelings toward Blacks and the undocumented. The Jewish coefficient in the racial resentment model is positive but also does not reach significance, again suggesting conflicting beliefs. The coefficients for Non-Traditional Orthodox and Non-Christian/Jewish respondents did not reach significance but also display mixed results. Atheists are positively associated with warm feelings toward Hispanics. The coefficient for Blacks is also positive but not significant. Atheists do not appear in Models 1 and 4 because it is a newer category.

Religiosity

Church attendance is measured from almost every week (1) to never (5) and is significant and positively associated with racial resentment and negatively associated with feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. Respondents who are not regular church goers are more racially resentful and respondents who do attend church regularly have colder feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. The coefficient for the undocumented is also negative but does not reach significance. Believing religion provides day-to-day guidance in one's life is positively associated with warm feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. The daily importance of religion is not significant, but the coefficient is negative in the racial resentment model and in the Black and Hispanic feeling thermometer models. The coefficient for Biblical authority (2) is significant and negatively correlated with racial resentment and positively associated with feelings toward Hispanic and undocumented immigrants. These mixed results suggest that individuals can and do hold both deeply religious and deeply discriminatory beliefs. Moreover, these individuals can and do hold conflicting beliefs about the same racial group.

Interacting Gender and Race

I estimated all four models again but included an interaction between gender and race to further assess which social groups are driving with mixed results. The table appears in [Appendix B](#). White males were associated with racial resentment and

negative feelings toward Blacks, Hispanics, and the undocumented. Affiliated Catholic White women from the South who do not attend church regularly are significantly more racially resentful than their peers. White Evangelical women hold significantly more favorable views of Blacks than their peers however their coefficient in the racial resentment model is also positive but did not reach significance. In addition, prior research makes a compelling case for disaggregating the data by race (Whites, African American, and Hispanics).⁵⁷ In doing so I find some interesting results. The table appears in [Appendix B](#).

Disaggregating by Race

Whites. White men are more resentful than White women and are also associated with colder feelings toward Black, Hispanics, and the undocumented. Educated Whites are less resentful and have warmer feelings toward Blacks. However, Whites that reported being in a higher social class were significantly more racially resentful than those that reported being in a lower social class. Southern Whites are more racially resentful than their peers. Conservative Whites are also more resentful and have colder feelings toward Blacks and the undocumented. White Catholics are associated with racial resentment and warmer feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. White Evangelicals are associated with warmer feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. The White Evangelical coefficients for resentment and undocumented are both negative but they do not reach significance. Religious guidance is positively associated with warmer feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. A belief in the absolute truth of the bible is associated with less resentment and warmer feelings toward Hispanics and the undocumented. Not attending church regularly is positively associated with resentment and attending church regularly is negatively associated with positive feelings toward Blacks. Irrespective of church attendance, Whites are associated with more negative beliefs and attitudes toward Blacks.

African Americans. Black Liberals are associated with warmer feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics. Black women are associated with warmer feelings toward African Americans as a group than Black men. Education is significant and negatively correlated with racial resentment. Black Evangelicals and those that say religion is important in their everyday lives are positively associated with racial resentment. This suggests that Evangelical ideology or the religiocultural tool kit is effective across racial lines. Black Evangelical males with less education seem to be internalizing anti-structuralism and individualism more so than their female peers. Again, this religiocultural tool kit includes disbelief in systemic racism and a belief that individuals are responsible for their own situatedness. These results foreshadow the Black male support former President Donald Trump received in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. In both elections, Trump won 10% of Blacks who attend church regularly.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Janelle S. Wong, *Immigrants, Evangelicals, and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2018); Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn, *The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

⁵⁸<https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/08/30/most-white-americans-who-regularly-attend-worship-services-voted-for-trump-in-2020/>; <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/08/30/most-white-americans-who-regularly-attend-worship-services-voted-for-trump-in-2020/>

In 2016, 11% of Black men without college degrees and 16% with college degrees supported Trump.⁵⁹ In 2020, 52% of Black men who identified as conservative, 26% of Black men with a high school diploma or less, and 22% of Black men with a bachelor's degree supported Trump.⁶⁰

Hispanics. Hispanics women have warmer feelings toward Blacks than their male peers. Hispanics living in urban areas have less favorable attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. Education has a significant and positive effect on Hispanics' feelings toward African Americans. In the racial resentment model, the coefficients for evangelicals, the importance of religion, and the authority of the bible are all negative but do not reach significance. Nonetheless, a belief in the authority of the bible is associated with warmer feelings toward Hispanics as a group. Hispanics do not appear to be as susceptible to anti-structuralism and individualist ideology. However, when examining Latino turnout in the 2016 and 2020 elections I find results similar to that of their Black peers. In 2016, Donald Trump won 28% of the Hispanic vote and 26% of Hispanic Catholics. 32% of the Latinos and 25% of Latinas supported it.⁶¹ In 2020, Hispanic support for Trump increased from 19% in 2016 to 27%.⁶² 40% of Latinos and 37% of Latinas, and 32% of Hispanic Catholics supported Trump in 2020.⁶³ This suggests that the Evangelical religiocultural tool kit has heterogeneous effects across race and gender.⁶⁴

Structural Equation Models

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a multivariate statistical analysis technique. SEM is the combination of factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. Structural models do not estimate a different trajectory for each respondent, but it does estimate the variance of random effects.⁶⁵ SEMs display interrelations among latent constructs and observed dependent variables as a succession of structural equations. It is applicable here because it allows me to estimate the direct effect of religiosity on the hypothesized mechanisms and the indirect effect of religiosity on subsequent public opinion mediated through said mechanisms. In addition, variables that are theoretically important like religiosity and ideology are not currently measured without substantial measurement error. An SEM model with these variables as latent variables gives the causal relationship between these variables in the absence of measurement error.⁶⁶

⁵⁹<https://www.mic.com/articles/159402/here-s-a-break-down-of-how-african-americans-voted-in-the-2016-election>

⁶⁰<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-men-drifted-democrats-toward-trump-record-numbers-polls-show-n1246447>

⁶¹<https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/national/president>; <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/>

⁶²<https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/10/11/the-latino-vote-in-the-2016-presidential-election/>; <https://jsri.msu.edu/publications/nexo/vol/no-2-spring-2021/latinos-in-the-2020-election>

⁶³<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinos-supported-trump-likely-lack-college-education-rcna1306>; <https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2020/11/06/catholic-vote-donald-trump-joe-biden-election-split>

⁶⁴Black women overwhelmingly supported the Democratic candidate in 2016 and 2020.

⁶⁵Alan C. Acock, *Discovering Structural Equation Modeling using Stata: Revised Edition* (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP, 2013).

⁶⁶Stephen L. Morgan, ed., *Handbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research* (New York, NY: Springer, 2013).

Scholars have critiqued the use of SEM to estimate causal mechanisms in that it “...does not easily extend to nonlinear or nonparametric models” and that it “obscures the identification assumptions required to identify causal mechanisms.”⁶⁷ The SEM model below was estimated as a maximum likelihood model with clustered robust standard errors. Maydeu-Olivares argues that maximum likelihood estimation is the method of choice and that employing robust standard errors and goodness-of-fit tests produces results with high empirical power.⁶⁸ The structural equation models were estimated as maximum likelihood with missing values using STATA 15 and the coefficients presented are the standardized coefficients. Tables with the standardized coefficients and direct and indirect effects are in [Appendix B](#).

Latent Variables

Latent Variables are not directly observed but rather inferred from other directly measured items. My latent variables are constructed utilizing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). CFA is a multivariate analysis used to examine how well the measured items represent a latent construct. Using CFA, I am also more likely to obtain stronger results because using latent variables as independent variables in the structural equation model reduces measurement error. Latent variables and not individual variables are used because mediator variables are of great theoretical importance. They provide the causal mechanism connecting the exogenous variable to the endogenous outcome variable.⁶⁹ Causal mechanisms are the process through which a causal variable influences an outcome variable.⁷⁰ Latent variables are advantageous because they allow for each of the observed items to have its own variance and the corresponding error term. The error terms allow for unique variations in the responses to each question. The latent variable produced accounts for how people respond to the included questions, which is what the items share. Another major advantage of using latent variables is that by isolating each item’s unique variance I can obtain a better measurement of the latent concept.⁷¹

The independent variables age, men, race, urbanism, south, income, work, union, education, parents, homeowner, married, children, and the racial composition index were used to create the latent variable *demographics*. To create the latent variable *religiosity*, I used five independent measures of religious devotion: Attendance, Authority 1, Authority 2, Guidance, and Importance. The latent variable *ideology* was created using moral traditionalism, equalitarianism, the ideology scale, and the liberal/conservative thermometer (1962–2012).

Structural equation models are primarily driven by theory. They are confirmatory analyses and can be either consistent (and support the theory) or inconsistent.⁷²

⁶⁷Kosuke Imai et al., “Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies,” *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 4 (2011), 765–89.

⁶⁸Alberto Maydeu-Olivares, “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Structural Equation Models for Continuous Data: Standard Errors and Goodness of Fit,” *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 24, no. 3 (2017), 383–94.

⁶⁹See note 65 above.

⁷⁰See note 67 above.

⁷¹See note 65 above.

⁷²James B. Schreiber et al., “Reporting Structural Equation Modeling and Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results: A Review,” *The Journal of Educational Research* 99, no. 6 (2006), 323–338




Figure 1. Religiosity and beliefs about and attitudes toward African Americans.

Restating my hypothesis, I posit that (1) that religious beliefs will be associated with both positive and negative attitudes toward out-groups; (2) that the negative effects will be racially heterogeneous; and (3) that religiosity will have both a direct and an indirect effect on racism and xenophobia mediated through belief systems and ideology. The results of a structural equation model should be discussed in terms of total, direct, and indirect effects, and not as cause. The direct effect represents the effect an independent variable has on a dependent variable and is depicted by the standardized path coefficients. The indirect effect represents the effect of the independent variable (here religiosity) on a dependent variable (here public opinion) through a mediating variable (here demographics and ideology). Again, mediator variables are of great theoretical importance. They provide the causal mechanism connecting the exogenous variable to the endogenous outcome variable. The total effect is the summation of the direct and indirect effects. I divide the indirect effect by the total effect to get the percentage of the effect that is indirect.⁷³ Figures 1 and 2 correspond to SEM 1 and 2. The tables with the total and indirect effect coefficients for SEMs 1 and 2 are in the Appendix.

Structural Equation Model 1: Beliefs about and Attitudes toward African Americans

In Structural Equation Model 1 I estimate the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on beliefs about and attitudes toward African Americans. SEM 1 was estimated as the maximum likelihood with missing values. This method is appropriate when you want to use all the available information in the presence of missing data on one or more variables. The r-squared = 0.94. If a respondent is one standard deviation higher

⁷³See note 65 above; See note 72 above; See note 66 above.




Figure 2. Religiosity and beliefs about and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants.

religiosity she will respond 0.59 standard deviations higher church attendance, -0.45 standard deviations lower on Authority 1, -0.54 standard deviations lower on Authority 2, 0.95 standard deviations higher on guidance, and 0.84 standard deviations higher on importance. Religiosity is associated with church attendance, a strong belief in the authority of the Bible, a belief that religion provides guidance in one’s day-to-day life and a belief in the importance of religion in one’s life. The direct path coefficient from religiosity to ideology is both positive and significant. If respondents are one standard deviation higher on ideology they will respond 0.52 standard deviations higher on moral traditionalism, -0.68 standard deviations lower on equalitarianism, 0.53 standard deviations higher on the ideology scale, and 0.58 standard deviations higher on the liberal/conservative thermometer. As it pertains to ideology, religiosity has a direct positive effect on moral traditionalism and conservatism.

The direct path coefficients from ideology to the dependent variables (beliefs about and attitudes toward African Americans) are all significant and in their expected directions. Ideology (as acted upon by religiosity) is positively correlated with racial resentment (0.65), the belief that Blacks should help themselves versus receiving aid from the government (0.56), and opposition to affirmative action (0.49). Ideology is also associated with negative feelings toward, not just Black militants (-0.37) but also of Blacks overall (-0.32). When estimating the indirect effects of religiosity on beliefs about and attitudes toward Blacks I find that 13% of the total effect is an indirect effect of religiosity.

Structural Equation Model 2: Beliefs about and Attitudes toward Hispanics

In Structural Equation Model 2 I estimate the direct and indirect effects of religiosity on public opinion toward Hispanics, immigrants, and the undocumented. SEM 2 was

also estimated as the maximum likelihood with missing values. The r -squared = 0.83. The results are consistent with SEM 1. If a respondent is one standard deviation higher religiosity she will respond 0.68 standard deviations higher church attendance, -0.51 standard deviations lower on Authority 1, -0.58 standard deviations lower on Authority 2, 0.84 standard deviations higher on guidance, and 0.73 standard deviations higher on importance. Religiosity continues to be associated with moral traditionalism and conservatism. The direct path coefficient from religiosity to ideology is also positive and significant. If a respondent is one standard deviation higher on ideology she will respond 0.58 standard deviations higher on moral traditionalism, -0.51 standard deviations lower on equalitarianism, 0.75 standard deviations higher on the ideology scale, and 0.81 standard deviations higher on the liberal/conservative thermometer. As it pertains to ideology, religiosity continues to have a positive effect on moral traditionalism and conservatism.

The direct path coefficients from ideology to the outcome variables (beliefs about and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants) are all significant and in their expected directions. Ideology (as acted upon by religiosity) has a positive effect on believing the number of immigrants should be reduced considerably (0.21) and the coefficients for the Hispanic (-0.12) and undocumented (-0.26) feeling thermometer questions are both negative suggesting a dislike of undocumented immigrants and Hispanics as a group. When estimating the indirect effects of religiosity on beliefs about and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants I find that 31% of the total effect is an indirect effect of religiosity.

Conclusion and Implications

My results show that religiosity has heterogeneous effects across race and religious affiliation and that religiosity has a large and significant negative effect on beliefs about and attitudes toward racial minorities, particularly the undocumented (Hispanics). This supports the research that suggests the beliefs espoused in churches influence the political ideology of its congregation. Moreover, it suggests that the effect is more complex than just religious affiliation. I found that different religious denominations hold both positive and negative opinions of African Americans and Hispanics. Secondly, my results suggest that religious individuals were primed with negative beliefs and attitudes about undocumented immigrants beyond what their non-religious peers received. Religiosity accounts for a third of the total negative effect on beliefs and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants.

The primary goal of this article is to examine how much religiosity affects political opinion and attitudes. This is not a condemnation of religion in general or any specific denomination. This is an attempt to tease out why we are witnessing overwhelming religious support for candidates and policies that are seemingly contrary to Christianity. I sought to demonstrate this using validated measures of demographics, ideology, and religiosity. Relying on ANES longitudinal data spanning 1948 to 2012 including thousands of respondents, and independent measures for both the predictive and dependent variables, I make a stronger case for the direct and indirect effects of religiosity than prior work by employing structural equation modeling. My second

goal has been to provide insight into the mechanisms or mediating variables informing racism and xenophobia. Future researchers exploring the relationship between religion and politics should continue to examine the direct and indirect effects of religion on public opinion. Religiosity should be viewed as an important factor in public opinion formation because these are the basis from which policy is formed. Hopefully, my research offers some insight into conducting this work.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data Availability Statement

The primary data is publicly available ANES data. I agree to allow the journal to review my data if requested.

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Appendix A

Independent Variables

Age is measured by the numerical age of the respondent. *Men* control for if the respondent is a man (1) or a woman (0). *Race* controls for if a respondent is White (0), Black (1), Hispanic (2), or mixed race (3). *Urbanism* controls if a respondent resides in a central city (1), a suburban area (2), or a rural or small town (3). The variable *South* controls whether a respondent resides in one of the eleven former states of the Confederacy. *Income* is measured by a percentile. There are five categories: 0–16 (1); 17–33 (2); 34–67 (3); 68–95 (4); and 96–100 (5). *Work* controls for whether the respondent was: employed (1); unemployed/laid off (2); retired (3); homemaker (4); and student (5). *Union* controls if someone in the respondent's home was in a union (1) or not (0). *Education* is measured from eight or fewer years of education (1) to having an advanced degree (7). The variable *parents* control for whether the respondent's parents were both born in the United States (1) or not (0). *Homeowner* controls for if a respondent owned a home (1) or not (0). The variable *married* controls a respondent's marital status. The possible responses were married (0); partner (1); never married (2); divorced (3); separated (4); widowed (5). *Children* control if the respondent had children. The responses ranged from none (0) to eight or more (8). The *racial composition* of a respondent's social environment is an additive index variable. With questions measuring the racial composition of a respondent's neighborhood (1964–1976), grade school (1964–1976), junior high school (1964–1970), high school (1964–1972), workplace/businesses/shops (1964–1972), and friends (1964–1976), the possible responses were: all White (1); mostly White (2); half and half (3); mostly Black (4); and all Black (5). The additive index is measured from all Black (1) to all White (29). Religious affiliation was measured as mainline Protestant (1); Evangelical (2), Roman Catholic (3); Jewish (4); non-traditional Orthodox (5); non-Christian/non-Jewish (6); and Atheist/agnostic/none/ (7).

Results for the Independent Variables

In Model 1 the dependent variable is the racial resentment index, in Model 2 the dependent variable is the Black feeling thermometer, in Model 3 the dependent variable is the Hispanic feeling thermometer, and in Model 4 the dependent variable is the undocumented feeling thermometer. Age is not significant in the racial resentment, Black, or undocumented models but the coefficients are in the expected direction. Age is significant and positively associated with the feeling toward Hispanics. White men are positively correlated with resentment, but the coefficient does not reach significance. White men are negatively associated with feelings toward Blacks, Hispanics, and the undocumented. Blacks are significantly less resentful and more favorable toward other blacks, Hispanics, and the undocumented. Likewise, Hispanics are significantly less resentful and more favorable toward Blacks, other Hispanics, and the undocumented. The coefficient for mixed raced respondents reaches significance in the resentment and undocumented models. Mixed raced individuals are less resentful and more favorable toward the undocumented.

Education is negatively associated with racial resentment and positively associated with feelings toward Blacks. Urbanism is associated with negative feelings toward the undocumented. The urbanism coefficients for resentment, Blacks, and Hispanics are negative but the coefficients do not reach statistical significance. The possible responses are central city (1), suburban (2), or rural (3). The results suggest that respondents that reside in rural areas have more negative feelings toward racial minorities. Residing in an area coded as South is positively associated with racial resentment. The coefficient for Blacks and the undocumented are in the expected negative direction but do not reach significance. A respondent's income percentile is not significant but the coefficient for Blacks is in the expected direction. Research has found that individuals in lower income percentiles have more negative feelings toward Blacks suggesting an economic racial threat effect. A respondent's self-reported social class is significant and positively associated with racial resentment. People perceiving themselves to be in higher social classes are more resentful. Having someone in a respondent's household who is a member of a union is positively associated with racial resentment. Looking at the demographic data, I find that those who report household union membership are overwhelmingly White and male. Ideology is positively associated with resentment and negatively associated with feelings toward Blacks and the undocumented. The results suggest that conservatives are more racially resentful, and liberals hold more favorable opinions toward minorities. The coefficient for Hispanics is also negative but does not reach significance.

Appendix B

Table B1. Gender and race interaction models.

Interaction models	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables	Racial resentment	Black thermometer	Hispanics thermometer	Undocumented thermometer
Age	-0.00122 (0.00704)	0.0158 (0.0215)	0.0808*** (0.0257)	0.0613 (0.0522)
Education	-0.673*** (0.0751)	1.290*** (0.237)	0.418 (0.286)	0.837 (0.558)
Urbanism	0.0657 (0.161)	-0.0800 (0.469)	-0.769 (0.559)	-2.273* (1.202)
South	0.846*** (0.268)	-0.490 (0.798)	0.498 (0.959)	-1.936 (1.992)
Income percentile	0.103 (0.119)	-0.665* (0.352)	0.0600 (0.422)	0.747 (0.879)
Social class	0.228*** (0.0695)	0.149 (0.214)	-0.0411 (0.253)	-0.255 (0.516)
Union household	0.762*** (0.274)	-0.764 (0.802)	-0.0921 (0.951)	-1.376 (2.032)
Ideology scale	0.471*** (0.0821)	-1.069*** (0.257)	-0.543* (0.302)	-2.035*** (0.608)
Evangelical	0.396 (0.292)	2.639*** (0.895)	1.892* (1.066)	-1.174 (2.170)
Catholic	0.895*** (0.290)	3.005*** (0.871)	3.070*** (1.036)	1.610 (2.150)
Jewish	0.170 (0.813)	4.652** (2.193)	4.107 (2.543)	14.05** (6.059)
Non-Trad. Orthodox	0.605 (0.844)	-0.252 (2.348)	2.068 (2.843)	-6.694 (6.294)
Non-Christ/Jewish	-2.603 (1.921)	4.584 (3.505)	-0.565 (4.474)	5.676 (14.32)
Atheist/Agnostic		11.03 (7.684)	17.54** (8.241)	
Church attendance	0.392*** (0.0907)	-0.717*** (0.278)	-0.578* (0.327)	-0.625 (0.670)
Religion important	-0.0336 (0.423)	-0.203 (1.285)	-0.907 (1.533)	3.136 (3.140)
Religious guidance	-0.0109 (0.163)	1.253** (0.494)	1.747*** (0.588)	1.268 (1.205)
Authority Bible	-0.637*** (0.190)	1.107* (0.593)	1.850*** (0.709)	3.831*** (1.414)
Black women	-3.332*** (0.478)	19.89*** (1.548)	5.976*** (1.881)	9.028** (3.562)
Hispanic women	-1.828*** (0.616)	4.947** (2.077)	12.68*** (2.558)	23.69*** (4.590)
Mixed race women	-2.370*** (0.806)	0.299 (3.135)	1.558 (3.621)	9.984* (6.010)
White men	0.506** (0.242)	-3.397*** (0.728)	-3.747*** (0.862)	-5.831*** (1.791)
Black men	-3.745*** (0.634)	14.94*** (1.838)	6.202*** (2.311)	15.65*** (4.673)
Hispanic men	-2.174*** (0.657)	0.0731 (2.122)	15.48*** (2.471)	18.32*** (4.820)
Mixed race men	-0.365 (1.345)	-0.343 (3.805)	1.011 (4.667)	13.44 (10.03)
Constant	9.690*** (0.963)	60.94*** (2.925)	55.07*** (3.465)	34.71*** (7.123)
Observations	965	3,352	2,722	975
R-squared	0.263	0.132	0.076	0.143

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B2. Whites direct effects models.

Whites models Variables	(1) Racial resentment	(2) Black thermometer	(3) Hispanics thermometer	(4) Undocumented thermometer
Age	-0.00658 (0.00761)	0.0271 (0.0236)	0.0825*** (0.0279)	0.0969* (0.0548)
Gender	0.526** (0.240)	-3.533*** (0.743)	-3.905*** (0.873)	-6.018*** (1.726)
Education	-0.767*** (0.0849)	1.420*** (0.269)	0.412 (0.320)	1.063* (0.611)
Urbanism	0.0766 (0.181)	0.144 (0.530)	-0.584 (0.622)	-1.910 (1.308)
South	1.300*** (0.309)	-0.922 (0.921)	-0.0340 (1.092)	-3.222 (2.223)
Income percentile	0.0675 (0.132)	-0.526 (0.393)	0.0203 (0.466)	0.979 (0.946)
Social class	0.240*** (0.0748)	0.206 (0.238)	0.0888 (0.277)	-0.288 (0.540)
Union HH	0.657** (0.301)	-1.015 (0.886)	0.233 (1.038)	-0.244 (2.164)
Ideology scale	0.534*** (0.0918)	-1.165*** (0.291)	-0.238 (0.337)	-2.086*** (0.659)
Evangelical	0.102 (0.324)	2.832*** (0.994)	3.175*** (1.171)	-0.254 (2.336)
Catholic	0.890*** (0.308)	3.071*** (0.939)	3.183*** (1.108)	1.032 (2.220)
Jewish	0.351 (0.808)	3.971* (2.254)	4.354* (2.582)	13.24** (5.850)
Non-Trad Orthodox	0.792 (0.862)	0.676 (2.477)	2.364 (2.951)	-7.015 (6.238)
Non-Christ/Jewish	-2.303 (2.305)	6.460 (4.659)	-2.212 (5.886)	10.33 (16.69)
Atheist		10.82 (7.805)	17.98** (8.310)	
Church attendance	0.389*** (0.0995)	-0.678** (0.311)	-0.466 (0.362)	-0.936 (0.714)
Religion important	-0.0902 (0.447)	-0.453 (1.401)	-0.913 (1.656)	2.446 (3.233)
Religious guidance	0.0116 (0.178)	1.117** (0.554)	1.718*** (0.650)	1.331 (1.282)
Authority Bible	-0.703*** (0.215)	1.229* (0.674)	2.153*** (0.798)	4.824*** (1.551)
Constant	10.19*** (1.075)	59.46*** (3.274)	51.96*** (3.827)	30.73*** (7.720)
Observations	782	2,801	2,296	790
R-squared	0.207	0.046	0.036	0.090

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B3. Black direct effects.

Blacks models Variables	(1) Racial resentment	(2) Black thermometer	(3) Hispanics thermometer	(4) Undocumented thermometer
Age	0.00208 (0.0277)	0.00227 (0.0710)	0.0845 (0.104)	-0.195 (0.256)
Gender	-0.969 (0.802)	-4.487** (2.109)	1.016 (3.058)	4.618 (7.367)
Education	-0.828*** (0.235)	-0.00753 (0.680)	0.0887 (0.984)	-1.457 (2.186)
Urbanism	-0.351 (0.500)	-1.063 (1.340)	0.0566 (1.925)	-2.843 (4.599)
South	0.111 (0.849)	-0.808 (2.324)	0.111 (3.306)	2.532 (7.870)
Income percentile	0.547 (0.382)	-0.672 (1.086)	1.071 (1.577)	-0.776 (3.502)
Social class	0.127 (0.273)	0.258 (0.718)	-0.0916 (1.030)	2.100 (2.541)
Union HH	-0.689 (0.977)	1.632 (2.685)	-3.154 (3.811)	-0.546 (9.088)
Ideology scale	-0.0117 (0.246)	-1.513** (0.693)	-2.441** (0.946)	-3.071 (2.293)
Evangelical	2.271** (0.912)	2.101 (2.780)	-5.576 (3.881)	-0.129 (8.492)
Catholic	1.959 (1.720)	1.288 (4.107)	2.378 (5.510)	5.929 (16.02)
Atheist		4.568 (7.009)	-0.930 (11.19)	
Church attendance	-0.0265 (0.313)	-0.868 (0.851)	-1.563 (1.222)	2.211 (2.918)
Religion important	6.999*** (2.206)	7.292 (5.387)	1.066 (7.729)	29.97 (20.54)
Religious guidance	-0.919 (0.554)	1.433 (1.431)	0.479 (2.024)	-1.056 (5.156)
Authority Bible	0.570 (0.642)	-0.862 (1.709)	-0.796 (2.492)	0.584 (5.971)
Constant	2.883 (3.155)	85.07*** (9.277)	79.11*** (13.10)	41.12 (28.96)
Observations	97	311	233	98
R-squared	0.233	0.078	0.068	0.089

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$.

Table B4. Hispanic direct effects.

Hispanics models Variables	(1) Racial resentment	(2) Black thermometer	(3) Hispanics thermometer	(4) Undocumented thermometer
Age	0.0368 (0.0330)	-0.0879 (0.0973)	0.0402 (0.105)	0.193 (0.275)
Gender	-0.654 (0.925)	-5.438* (2.786)	2.139 (3.074)	-9.670 (7.697)
Education	-0.135 (0.252)	2.311*** (0.837)	1.293 (0.937)	0.497 (2.100)
Urbanism	0.0384 (0.622)	-0.196 (1.923)	-3.328 (2.179)	-13.43** (5.187)
South	-0.279 (0.968)	4.825* (2.906)	2.984 (3.194)	-1.780 (8.005)
Income percentile	0.364 (0.505)	-2.389 (1.450)	-1.223 (1.648)	-2.186 (4.212)
Social class	0.411 (0.301)	-1.367 (0.846)	-1.420 (1.008)	-4.350* (2.489)
Union HH	2.100* (1.089)	0.0114 (3.235)	0.0843 (3.614)	-5.227 (9.064)
Ideology scale	0.0889 (0.384)	-0.337 (1.053)	-1.643 (1.173)	-3.061 (3.197)
Evangelical	-0.853 (1.612)	3.443 (5.530)	-0.504 (6.221)	7.763 (13.46)
Catholic	-0.295 (1.434)	4.905 (4.492)	4.010 (5.042)	10.08 (11.97)
Jewish		28.71 (18.31)		
Non-Trad Orthodox		-16.01 (13.68)	-10.26 (18.68)	
Non-Christ/Jewish		29.51 (18.73)	20.33 (18.72)	
Church attendance	0.460 (0.384)	-0.148 (1.152)	-0.191 (1.227)	1.682 (3.106)
Religion important	-4.446** (1.961)	-1.291 (5.432)	1.916 (6.091)	9.128 (16.01)
Religious guidance	1.425* (0.712)	1.954 (1.964)	2.414 (2.198)	-2.549 (5.766)
Authority Bible	-1.351** (0.649)	3.000 (2.116)	4.512* (2.296)	-3.818 (5.376)
Constant	8.131** (3.091)	63.46*** (10.56)	72.43*** (11.83)	97.10*** (25.73)
Observations	62	178	142	63
R-squared	0.291	0.140	0.148	0.205

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B5. Religiosity and attitudes toward Blacks.

Variables	Demo.	Ideology	Age	Gender	Race	Urbanism	South	Income %	Work	Union HH	EDU
Demographics		-0.0926*** (0.00409)	1 (0)	-0.0227*** (0.000747)	0.0350*** (0.00158)	0.00440*** (0.00106)	0.0156*** (0.000654)	-0.176*** (0.00451)	0.160*** (0.00428)	-0.0213*** (0.000643)	-0.100*** (0.00329)
Religiosity	0.480*** (0.0233)	0.171*** (0.00865)									
Ideology			45.86*** (0.0753)	0.448*** (0.00211)	0.446*** (0.00473)	2.113*** (0.00379)	0.298*** (0.00197)	2.861*** (0.00507)	2.892*** (0.0121)	0.209*** (0.00175)	3.703*** (0.00772)
Constant	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673
Variables	Parents	Homeowner	Marital	Children	Race Comp	Tradition	Equal	Ideology	Aid Black	Lib/Conser	
Demographics	0.000295 (0.000482)	-0.0311*** (0.00112)	0.213*** (0.00484)	0.00320 (0.00570)	-0.370*** (0.0367)						
Religiosity											
Ideology						1 (0)	-1.826*** (0.0326)	0.408*** (0.00721)	0.573*** (0.0112)	5.329*** (0.0866)	
Constant	0.820*** (0.00179)	0.676*** (0.00214)	1.214*** (0.00750)	2.047*** (0.0220)	23.00*** (0.132)	10.37*** (0.0224)	15.66*** (0.0299)	4.202*** (0.00750)	4.489*** (0.00962)	51.49*** (0.0825)	
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673
Variables	Resentment	Black	Black Milit.	Aff. Action	Attendance	Authority 1	Authority 2	Guidance	Important		
Demographics											
Religiosity											
Ideology	1.419*** (0.0274)	-3.990*** (0.104)	-7.342*** (0.253)	0.393*** (0.00874)	1 (0)	-0.168*** (0.00434)	-0.200*** (0.00307)	0.591*** (0.00629)	0.193*** (0.00203)		
Constant	10.46*** (0.0261)	68.90*** (0.106)	35.75*** (0.274)	4.031*** (0.0100)	4.551*** (0.0204)	1.605*** (0.00639)	1.797*** (0.00488)	1.689*** (0.00692)	0.753*** (0.00254)		
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6. Religiosity and attitudes toward Hispanics.

Variables	Demographics	Ideology	Age	Gender	Race	Urbanism	South	Income %	Work	Union HH	EDU
Demographics		-0.117*** (0.00552)	1 (0)	-0.0276*** (0.00105)	0.0513*** (0.00228)	0.00235* (0.00137)	0.0238*** (0.000962)	-0.261*** (0.00794)	0.220*** (0.00694)	-0.0302*** (0.00104)	-0.0990*** (0.00419)
Religiosity	0.291*** (0.0161)	0.317*** (0.00862)									
Ideology											
Constant	45.86*** (0.0757)	0.446*** (0.00473)	2.112*** (0.00380)	0.447*** (0.00211)	0.446*** (0.00473)	2.112*** (0.00380)	0.297*** (0.00197)	2.860*** (0.00508)	2.948*** (0.0123)	0.208*** (0.00175)	3.703*** (0.00771)
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673
Variables	Parents	Home owner	Marital status	Children	Race Comp	Traditionalism	Equalitarianism	Ideology	# Immigrants	Lib/Conser	Hispanics
Demographics	0.00220*** (0.000629)	-0.0462*** (0.00162)	0.263*** (0.00746)	-0.0221*** (0.00770)	-0.495*** (0.0482)						
Religiosity											
Ideology											
Constant	0.820*** (0.00179)	0.675*** (0.00217)	1.212*** (0.00750)	2.042*** (0.0220)	22.97*** (0.132)	10.41*** (0.0217)	-1.214*** (0.0205)	0.517*** (0.00662)	0.109*** (0.00455)	6.634*** (0.0888)	-1.370*** (0.0851)
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673
Variables	Undocumented	Attendance	Authority 1	Authority 2	Guidance	Important					
Demographics											
Religiosity											
Ideology	-4.045*** (0.134)										
Constant	45.36*** (0.224)	4.537*** (0.0206)	1.603*** (0.00638)	1.799*** (0.00487)	1.688*** (0.00692)	0.753*** (0.00251)					
Observations	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673	55,673					

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table B7. Indirect effects SEM 2.

Religiosity and attitudes of Blacks Measurement	Indirect effect Coef.	Total effect Coef.	% Effect Indirect
Age			
Demographics	(no path)	0.27**	
Religiosity	0.051**	0.051**	
Gender			
Demographics	(no path)	0.214**	
Religiosity	0.041	0.041**	
Race			
Demographics	(no path)	0.149**	
Religiosity	0.0269**	0.029**	
Urbanism			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0261**	
Religiosity	0.005**	0.005**	
South			
Demographics	(no path)	0.16**	
Religiosity	0.031**	0.031**	
Income percentile			
Demographics	(no path)	0.713**	
Religiosity	0.137**	0.137**	
Work status			
Demographics	(no path)	0.304**	
Religiosity	0.058**	0.058**	
Union			
Demographics	(no path)	0.026**	
Religiosity	0.047**	0.047**	
Education			
Demographics	(no path)	0.261**	
Religiosity	0.05**	0.05**	
Parents native			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0036**	
Religiosity	0.0007**	0.007**	
Home owner			
Demographics	(no path)	0.313**	
Religiosity	0.06**	0.06**	
Marital status			
Demographics	(no path)	0.58**	
Religiosity	0.11**	0.11**	
Children			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0083**	
Religiosity	0.0016**	0.0016**	
Racial Comp Indx			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.315**	
Religiosity	-0.06**	-0.06**	
Racial Resent.			
Demographics	-0.16**	-0.16**	
Ideology	(no path)	0.65**	
Religiosity	0.09**	0.09**	
Equalitarianism			
Demographics	0.167**	0.167**	
Ideology	(no path)	-0.682**	
Religiosity	-0.0912**	-0.0912**	
Moral traditional			
Demographics	-0.127**	-0.127**	

(continued)

Table B7. Continued.

Religiosity and attitudes of Blacks Measurement	Indirect effect Coef.	Total effect Coef.	% Effect Indirect
Ideology	(no path)	0.517**	
Religiosity	0.07**	0.07**	
Ideology scale			
Demographics	-0.13**	-0.13**	
Ideology	(no path)	0.53**	
Religiosity	0.071**	0.071**	
Aid to Blacks			
Demographics	-0.137**	-0.137**	24%
Ideology	(no path)	0.56**	(direct)
Religiosity	0.752**	0.752**	13%
Black Therm			
Demographics	0.078**	0.078**	24%
Ideology	(no path)	-0.32**	(direct)
Religiosity	-0.042**	-0.042**	13%
Resentment			
Demographics	-0.16**	-0.16**	24%
Ideology	(no path)	0.65**	(direct)
Religiosity	0.087**	0.087**	13%
Affirmative Act.			
Demographics	-0.12**	-0.12**	24%
Ideology	(no path)	0.49**	(direct)
Religiosity	0.066**	0.066**	13%
Militants Therm			
Demographics	0.09**	0.09**	24%
Ideology	(no path)	-0.37**	(direct)
Religiosity	-0.042**	-0.042**	13%
Church Attend.			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.6**	
Auth Bible1			
Religiosity	(no path)	-0.452**	
Religion Impt			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.843**	
Religious guide			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.949**	
Structural			
Demographics			
Religiosity	(no path)	-0.19**	
Ideology			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.245**	
Religiosity	0.0211	0.134**	

Standardized coefficients.

** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8. Indirect effects SEM 3.

Religiosity and attitudes of Hispanic Measurement	Indirect effect Coef.	Total effect Coef.	% Effect Indirect
Age			
Demographics	(no path)	0.198**	
Religiosity	0.0357**	0.0357**	
Gender			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.193**	
Religiosity	0.0348**	0.0348**	
Race			
Demographics	(no path)	0.161**	
Religiosity	0.0292**	0.0292**	
Urbanism			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0103**	
Religiosity	0.0019**	0.0019**	
South			
Demographics	(no path)	0.181**	
Religiosity	0.033**	0.033**	
Income percentile			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.784**	
Religiosity	-0.142**	-0.142**	
Work status			
Demographics	(no path)	0.31**	
Religiosity	0.056**	0.056**	
Union			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.259**	
Religiosity	-0.047**	-0.047**	
Education			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.191**	
Religiosity	-0.035**	-0.035**	
Parents native			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0198	
Religiosity	0.0036	0.0036	
Home owner			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.341**	
Religiosity	-0.062**	-0.062**	
Marital status			
Demographics	(no path)	0.525**	
Religiosity	0.095**	0.095**	
Children			
Demographics	(no path)	0.0421**	
Religiosity	-0.0076**	-0.0076**	
Racial Comp Indx			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.312	
Religiosity	-0.056**	-0.056**	
Moral traditional			
Demographics	-0.12**	-0.12**	
Ideology	(no path)	0.577**	
Religiosity	0.179**	0.179**	
Equalitarianism			
Demographics	0.105	0.105**	
Ideology	(no path)	-0.505**	
Religiosity	-0.157**	-0.157**	
Ideology scale			
Demographics	-0.155**	-0.155**	
Ideology	(no path)	0.75	

(continued)

Table B8. Continued.

Religiosity and attitudes of Hispanic Measurement	Indirect effect Coef.	Total effect Coef.	% Effect Indirect
Religiosity	0.233**	0.233**	
Ideology Therm			
Demographics	-0.167**	-0.167**	
Ideology	(no path)	0.807**	
Religiosity	0.251**	0.251**	
# Immigrants			
Demographics	-0.0429**	-0.0429**	21%
Ideology	(no path)	0.207**	(direct)
Religiosity	0.0642**	0.0642**	31%
Hispanic Therm			
Demographics	0.0244**	0.0244**	21%
Ideology	(no path)	-0.118**	(direct)
Religiosity	-0.0365**	-0.0365**	31%
Undocumt. Therm			
Demographics	0.054**	0.054**	21%
Ideology	(no path)	-0.261**	(direct)
Religiosity	-0.08132**	-0.0813**	31%
Church Attend.			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.679**	
Auth Bible1			
Religiosity	(no path)	-0.506**	
Auth Bible2			
Religiosity	(no path)	-0.583**	
Guidance			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.837**	
Importance			
Religiosity	(no path)	0.726**	
Structural			
Demographics			
Religiosity	(no path)	-0.181**	
Ideology			
Demographics	(no path)	-0.207**	
Religiosity	-0.037	0.311**	

Standardized coefficients.

** $p < 0.01$.